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OPINION OF THE COURT 
___________ 
 
PER CURIAM. 
 Hector Huertas appeals pro se from the District 
Court‟s dismissal of his claims against Asset Management 
Professionals (“AMP”) and Applied Card Bank f/k/a Cross 
Country Bank (“ACB”).1  For the following reasons, we will 
affirm. 
 
I. 
 
 In addition to AMP and ACB, Huertas brought this 
lawsuit against four other defendants – Galaxy Asset 
Management f/k/a Galaxy Asset purchasing (“Galaxy”); 
Capital Management Services, L.P.; Experian Information 
Solutions; and TransUnion, LLC.  Huertas incurred credit 
card debt owed to ACB, which sold the debt obligation to 
Galaxy, which ultimately retained AMP to collect on the debt.  
Huertas‟s claims are primarily based upon ACB‟s transfer of, 
and AMP‟s attempts to collect, a “false” debt, i.e., a debt 
                                                 
 
1
  ACB changed its name to Applied Bank; however, 
we will use ACB for ease of reference. 
 
3 
 
upon which the six-year statute of limitations had run under 
New Jersey law.
2
  Specifically, Huertas alleged that AMP 
violated the Fair Debt Collection Practices Act (“FDCPA”) 
by sending him a letter in February 2009 in an attempt to 
collect on the time-barred debt, and violated the Fair Credit 
Reporting Act (“FCRA”) by acquiring his credit information 
from TransUnion in connection with its improper debt 
collection efforts.  Huertas also alleged that both ACB and 
AMP breached their duties of good faith and fair dealing, 
violated the New Jersey Consumer Fraud Act (“NJCFA”), 
N.J. Stat. Ann. §§ 56:8-1 to -20, and violated the Racketeer 
Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (“RICO”), 18 
U.S.C. §§ 1961-1968.       
 
 AMP and ACB moved to dismiss the claims against 
them, pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6), 
for failure to state a claim.  Huertas responded with a “Motion 
for Judgment on the Pleadings and for Sanctions In Response 
to Defendant‟s Applied Bank and Asset Management 
Professionals Motions to Dismiss.”  The District Court 
granted AMP‟s and ACB‟s motions and denied Huertas‟s 
motion.  The District Court reasoned that expiration of the 
statute of limitations makes a debt unenforceable, but does 
not extinguish the debt itself, such that neither ACB‟s 
assignment of Huertas‟s debt nor AMP‟s attempt to collect on 
the debt violated the law or breached any duty.   
 
 Despite having rejected Huertas‟s claims to the extent 
that they were based on a time-barred debt, the District Court 
                                                 
 
2
  The complaint also alleged that the statute of 
limitations had expired under Pennsylvania law, presumably 
because ACB‟s predecessor was a Pennsylvania Corporation.  
See 42 Pa. Cons. Stat. Ann. § 5525 (four year statute of 
limitations).  However, since Huertas lives in New Jersey, 
brought his state claims under New Jersey law, repeatedly 
refers to New Jersey‟s six-year statute of limitations, see N.J. 
Stat. Ann. § 2A:14-1, and was contacted by AMP at his New 
Jersey address, we will assume that New Jersey‟s statute of 
limitations applies.  The complaint suggests that Huertas had 
incurred the debt by 2001.  
4 
 
recognized that Huertas‟s filings indicated that he had 
previously filed for bankruptcy.  Since it was unclear to the 
District Court whether Huertas was alleging that the 
defendants had attempted to collect a debt extinguished by 
bankruptcy proceedings, the District Court allowed Huertas to 
amend his complaint to assert such a theory.   
  
 Huertas did not file an amended complaint within the 
time period prescribed by the District Court.  Instead, he 
dismissed his claims against the remaining defendants, and 
timely appealed to this Court.  On appeal, Huertas explained 
that he did not amend his complaint because his debt had not, 
in fact, been discharged in bankruptcy.  
   
II. 
 
 The District Court‟s jurisdiction arose under 28 U.S.C. 
§§ 1331 & 1367.  Our jurisdiction is based on 28 U.S.C. § 
1291.
3
  Our review of the District Court‟s decision to grant 
AMP and ACB‟s motions to dismiss is plenary.  Grier v. 
Klem, 591 F.3d 672, 676 (3d Cir. 2010).  “[W]e accept as true 
all well-pled factual allegations in the complaint and all 
reasonable inferences that can be drawn from them, and we 
affirm the order of dismissal only if the pleading does not 
plausibly suggest an entitlement to relief.”  Fellner v. Tri-
Union Seafoods, L.L.C., 539 F.3d 237, 242 (3d Cir. 2008).  
We may also consider documents attached to the complaint.  
Pension Benefit Guar. Corp. v. White Consol. Indus., Inc., 
998 F.2d 1192, 1196 (3d Cir. 1993).  Furthermore, we must 
                                                 
 
3
  Huertas‟s failure to amend his complaint in the time 
frame allotted by the District Court reflects his intention to 
stand on his complaint, which renders the District Court‟s 
order final as to ACB and AMP for purposes of § 1291.  See 
Batoff v. State Farm Ins. Co., 977 F.2d 848, 851 n.5 (3d Cir. 
1992).  Furthermore, his appeal is timely because the District 
Court‟s order granting the motions to dismiss was not 
appealable until the claims against all defendants were 
resolved.  See DeJohn v. Temple Univ., 537 F.3d 301, 306-07 
(3d Cir. 2008).   
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construe Huertas‟s complaint liberally because he is 
proceeding pro se.  Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 94 
(2007).   The same standard of review applies to a motion for 
judgment on the pleadings.  Leamer v. Fauver, 288 F.3d 532, 
535 (3d Cir. 2002). 
 
III. 
 
A. Validity of the Debt 
 
 Huertas‟s primary contention on appeal is that the 
District Court erred in concluding that the expiration of the 
statute of limitations did not extinguish his debt.  We agree 
with the District Court, however, that, under New Jersey law, 
Huertas‟s debt obligation is not extinguished by the 
expiration of the statute of limitations, even though the debt is 
ultimately unenforceable in a court of law.
4
  See R.A.C. v. 
P.J.S., Jr., 927 A.2d 97, 106 (N.J. 2007) (“When a procedural 
statute of limitations runs its course, only the remedy is 
barred, not the common law right.”); Hollings v. Hollings, 73 
A.2d 755, 757 (N.J. Super. Ct. Ch. Div. 1950) (observing that 
a statute of limitations “is a bar to the remedy only, and does 
not extinguish, or even impair, the obligation of the debtor”), 
aff‟d, 78 A.2d 919 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1951).  In other 
words, Huertas still owes the debt – it is not extinguished as a 
matter of law – but he has a complete legal defense against 
having to pay it.  Having reached that conclusion, we agree 
with the District Court that Huertas has failed to state claims 
against AMP and ACB for the reasons below. 
                                                 
4
  The authorities upon which Huertas relies, Davis v. 
Mills, 194 U.S. 451 (1904), and Sebring Associates v. Coyle, 
790 A.2d 225 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 2002), are not to the 
contrary.  Davis does not govern how New Jersey treats a 
time-barred debt under state law and concerned the running of 
the statute of limitations on a statutory cause of action as 
opposed to a common law obligation.  Sebring concerned 
how a time-barred loan owed to the bank should be treated as 
between a partnership and a partner who had defaulted on the 
loan.   
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B. FDCPA claim 
 
 Huertas‟s FDCPA claim against AMP turns on 
whether a debt collector may attempt to collect upon a time-
barred debt without violating the statute.  The FDCPA 
prohibits a debt collector from “us[ing] any false, deceptive, 
or misleading representation or means in connection with the 
collection of any debt,” 15 U.S.C. § 1692e, including falsely 
representing “the character, amount, or legal status of any 
debt,” id. § 1692e(2)(A).  The FDCPA also prohibits debt 
collectors from using unfair or unconscionable means of 
collecting a debt.  Id. § 1692f.   
 
 Although our Court has not yet addressed the issue, the 
majority of courts have held that when the expiration of the 
statute of limitations does not invalidate a debt, but merely 
renders it unenforceable, the FDCPA permits a debt collector 
to seek voluntary repayment of the time-barred debt so long 
as the debt collector does not initiate or threaten legal action 
in connection with its debt collection efforts.  Compare 
Freyermuth v. Credit Bureau Servs., Inc., 248 F.3d 767, 771 
(8th Cir. 2001) (“[I]n the absence of a threat of litigation or 
actual litigation, no violation of the FDCPA has occurred 
when a debt collector attempts to collect on a potentially 
time-barred debt that is otherwise valid.”), Wallace v. Capital 
One Bank, 168 F. Supp. 2d 526, 527-29 (D. Md. 2001) (debt 
validation notices that were silent as to whether debt was time 
barred and which did not threaten collection action did not 
violate FDCPA), and Shorty v. Capital One Bank, 90 F. Supp. 
2d 1330, 1331-33 (D.N.M. 2000) (sending of debt validation 
notice regarding time-barred debt did not violate the 
FDCPA), with Larsen v. JBC Legal Grp., P.C., 533 F. Supp. 
2d 290, 302-03 (E.D.N.Y. 2008) (threatening legal action on 
time-barred debt violated FDCPA), Beattie v. D.M. 
Collections, Inc., 754 F. Supp. 383, 393 (D. Del. 1991) 
(“[T]he threatening of a lawsuit which the debt collector 
knows or should know is unavailable or unwinnable by 
reason of a legal bar such as the statute of limitations is the 
kind of abusive practice the FDCPA was intended to 
eliminate.”), and Kimber v. Fed. Fin. Corp., 668 F. Supp. 
7 
 
1480, 1487 (M.D. Ala. 1987) (“[A] debt collector‟s filing of a 
lawsuit on a debt that appears to be time-barred, without the 
debt collector having first determined after a reasonable 
inquiry that that limitations period has been or should be 
tolled, is an unfair and unconscionable means of collecting 
the debt.”).  We agree with the logic underlying those 
decisions and conclude that Huertas‟s FDCPA claim hinges 
on whether AMP‟s February 11, 2009, letter threatened 
litigation.   
 
 Whether a debt collector‟s communications threaten 
litigation in a manner that violates the FDCPA depends on the 
language of the letter, which “should be analyzed from the 
perspective of the „least sophisticated debtor.‟”5  Brown v. 
Card Serv. Ctr., 464 F.3d 450, 453 (3d Cir. 2006) (quoting 
Wilson, 225 F.3d at 354).  AMP‟s letter indicates that 
Huertas‟s account has been reassigned, requests that Huertas 
call “to resolve this issue,” includes a privacy notice 
informing him that Galaxy would be accessing his private 
consumer information, and, as required by 15 U.S.C. § 
1692g(a), indicates that, if Huertas does not dispute the debt 
within thirty days of receiving the letter, AMP will assume 
the debt is valid.  (App. 33.)  At the bottom, the letter states, 
in bold, capital letters, “THIS IS AN ATTEMPT TO 
COLLECT A DEBT.”  (Id.) 
 
 Even the least sophisticated consumer would not 
understand AMP‟s letter to explicitly or implicitly threaten 
litigation.  Furthermore, the FDCPA requires debt collectors 
to inform a debtor “that the debt collector is attempting to 
collect a debt.”  15 U.S.C. § 1692e(11).  Since it is 
appropriate for a debt collector to request voluntary 
repayment of a time-barred debt, see Freyermuth, 248 F.3d at 
771, it would be unfair if debt collectors were found to violate 
                                                 
5
 In this Circuit, such an analysis is appropriately 
undertaken on a Rule 12(b)(6) motion, see Wilson v. 
Quadramed Corp., 225 F.3d 350, 353 n.2 (3d Cir. 2000), or a 
motion for judgment on the pleadings, see Rosenau v. 
Unifund Corp., 539 F.3d 218, 221 (3d Cir. 2008). 
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the FDCPA both if they include the mandated language 
(because inclusion would threaten suit) and if they do not 
(because failure to include a mandatory notice violates the 
statute).  Accordingly, Huertas has not stated a claim under 
the FDCPA based upon AMP‟s letter, and we will affirm the 
District Court‟s dismissal of that claim.6  See Walker v. Cash 
Flow Consultants, Inc., 200 F.R.D. 613, 615-16 (N.D. Ill. 
2001) (following Freyermuth and granting motion to dismiss 
when the complaint did not allege that debt collector 
implicitly or explicitly threatened litigation and claim was 
based solely on the fact that debt collector sent collection 
letter after limitations period expired). 
 
C. FCRA claim 
 
 Huertas‟s FCRA claim asserts that AMP obtained his 
credit report from TransUnion, a credit reporting agency, 
“without any FCRA-sanctioned purpose.”  (App. 12.)  The 
FCRA imposes civil liability upon a person who willfully 
obtains a consumer report for a purpose that is not authorized 
by the FCRA.  15 U.S.C. §§ 1681b(f), 1681n(a).  However, 
the statute expressly permits distribution of a consumer report 
to an entity that “intends to use the information in connection 
with a credit transaction involving the consumer on whom the 
information is to be furnished and involving the extension of 
credit to, or review or collection of an account of, the 
consumer.”7  Id. § 1681b(a)(3)(A) (emphasis added).  Huertas 
                                                 
6
  In his complaint, Huertas also alleged that AMP‟s 
failure to “reinvestigate” the debt violated the FDCPA.  
However, he appears to have abandoned that claim since he 
did not clarify or even mention it in his briefing before the 
District Court or this Court.   
 
7
  Huertas‟s assertion that § 1681b(a)(3)(A) only 
permits the use of consumer information in connection with 
an extension of credit is premised on a misreading of the 
provision, which, when read properly, clearly authorizes use 
of a consumer report (1) “in connection with a credit 
transaction involving the consumer on whom the information 
is to be furnished,” and (2) involving either (a) the extension 
9 
 
sought credit from ACB, which he received, and accumulated 
credit card debt.  It was that consumer transaction which 
ultimately resulted in AMP‟s accessing of Huertas‟s credit 
report to collect on his delinquent accounts.  Section 
1681b(a)(3)(A) authorizes the use of consumer information 
under such circumstances.  See Phillips v. Grendahl, 312 F.3d 
357, 366 (8th Cir. 2002), abrogated on other grounds, Safeco 
Ins. Co. of Am. v. Burr, 551 U.S. 47 (2007); see also 
Stergiopoulous v. First Midwest Bancorp, Inc., 427 F.3d 
1043, 1046-47 (7th Cir. 2005). 
 
 In his brief, Huertas points out that the FCRA prohibits 
a consumer reporting agency from making a consumer report 
containing “[a]ccounts placed for collection or charged to 
profit and loss which antedate the report by more than seven 
years,” measured from 180 days after the account is placed in 
collection or charged off by the creditor.  15 U.S.C. § 
1681c(a)(4), (c)(1).  Even if we were to consider this 
argument, which was not raised before the District Court, it is 
TransUnion, the consumer reporting agency, and not AMP, 
that created the consumer report of which Huertas complains.  
Accordingly, even assuming that this provision of the FCRA 
was violated, Huertas cannot state a claim against AMP on 
that basis.  See D‟Angelo v. Wilmington Med. Ctr., Inc., 515 
F. Supp. 1250, 1253 (D. Del. 1981) (collection agency that 
provided information to consumer reporting agency regarding 
a debt was not a consumer reporting agency under the 
FCRA).  Furthermore, Huertas cannot base his claim on 15 
U.S.C. § 1681s-2(a)(1)(A), because no private right of action 
exists under that provision.  See 15 U.S.C. § 1681s-2(c), (d); 
Nelson v. Chase Manhattan Mortg. Corp., 282 F.3d 1057, 
1059 (9th Cir. 2002).  Accordingly, we will affirm the District 
Court‟s dismissal of Huertas‟s FCRA claim against AMP. 
                                                                                                             
of credit to that consumer, or (b) “review or collection” of the 
consumer‟s account. 
10 
 
D. Remaining claims 
 
 We will also affirm the dismissal of Huertas‟s RICO 
and state law claims against AMP and ACB.  Huertas has 
failed to state a claim under the NJCFA because his 
complaint is not based on AMP or ACB‟s marketing or sale 
of merchandise or services to him.  See Del Tufo v. Nat‟l 
Republican Senatorial Comm., 591 A.2d 1040, 1042 (N.J. 
Super. Ct. Ch. Div. 1991) (“[T]he reach of the [NJCFA] is 
intended to encompass only consumer oriented commercial 
transactions involving the marketing and sale of merchandise 
or services.”); see also J&R Ice Cream Corp. v. Cal. 
Smoothie Licensing Corp., 31 F.3d 1259, 1272-73 (3d Cir. 
1994).  Instead, he seeks to recover for ACB‟s transfer of his 
debt to third parties and AMP‟s attempts to collect the 
account – actions that do not fall within the NJCFA.  Cf. Joe 
Hand Promotions, Inc. v. Mills, 567 F. Supp. 2d 719, 723-24 
(D.N.J. 2008) (holding that letter from attorney fraudulently 
accusing plaintiff of violating defendant's exclusive licensing 
rights was not actionable under the NJCFA because letter did 
not involve a sale of merchandise).  Huertas‟s CFA claims 
also fail because the fact that defendants sought payment on a 
valid, even if unenforceable, debt does not equate to fraud 
absent allegations indicating that they made false or 
misleading representations.  See N.J. Stat. Ann. § 56:8-2. 
 
 Finally, we fail to see how AMP‟s attempts to collect 
on a time-barred debt or ACB‟s transfer of that debt to a third 
party violates RICO or breaches the duty of good faith and 
fair dealing.  See 18 U.S.C. §§ 1962(c) (prohibiting “any 
person employed by or associated with any enterprise 
engaged in, or the activities of which affect, interstate or 
foreign commerce, [from] conduct[ing] or participat[ing], 
directly or indirectly, in the conduct of such enterprise‟s 
affairs through a pattern of racketeering activity or collection 
of unlawful debt”), 1961(1) (defining “racketeering activity” 
as certain criminal activity), 1961(6) (defining “unlawful 
debt” as a debt incurred in connection with gambling activity 
or which is usurious); see also Brunswick Hills Racquet Club, 
Inc. v. Route 18 Shopping Ctr. Assocs., 864 A.2d 387, 396 
(N.J. 2005) (“The party claiming a breach of the covenant of 
11 
 
good faith and fair dealing must provide evidence sufficient 
to support a conclusion that the party alleged to have acted in 
bad faith has engaged in some conduct that denied the benefit 
of the bargain originally intended by the parties.”) (quotations 
omitted).  Although Huertas may have had a credit card 
contract with ACB, he has not alleged facts that would 
support a conclusion that he was deprived of the benefit of his 
bargain under that contract.  See Seidenberg v. Summit Bank, 
791 A.2d 1068, 1077 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 2002) (“The 
guiding principle in the application of the implied covenant of 
good faith and fair dealing emanates from the fundamental 
notion that a party to a contract may not unreasonably 
frustrate its purpose.”) 
 
 Accordingly, we will affirm the dismissal of the 
remaining claims against ACB and AMP. 
 
IV. 
 
 In sum, we will affirm the District Court‟s dismissal of 
Huertas‟s claims against AMP and ACB and its denial of 
Huertas‟s motion for judgment on the pleadings. 
 
   Huertas also filed a motion for leave to file the second 
volume of the joint appendix under seal.  Although it would 
have been preferable for Huertas to file a redacted appendix 
for the public file and provide an unredacted version for the 
Court, we recognize that Huertas is proceeding pro se and 
will grant the motion to seal because the second volume of 
the joint appendix contains personal identifying information, 
including Huertas‟s social security number and bank 
accounts.  See 3d Cir. LAR 113.12. 
